AMMUNITION INDUSTRIAL BASE ASSESSMENT TOOL IN SUPPORT OF “PUBLIC LAW 105-261, SECTION 806: PROCUREMENT OF CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION” by Meierdiercks, Brian
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2019-06
AMMUNITION INDUSTRIAL BASE ASSESSMENT
TOOL IN SUPPORT OF PUBLIC LAW 105-261,
SECTION 806: PROCUREMENT OF
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION
Meierdiercks, Brian
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/62808
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.





JOINT APPLIED PROJECT REPORT 
AMMUNITION INDUSTRIAL BASE ASSESSMENT TOOL 
IN SUPPORT OF “PUBLIC LAW 105-261, SECTION 806: 
PROCUREMENT OF CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION”
June 2019 
By: Brian Meierdiercks 
Advisor: Robert F. Mortlock 
Co-Advisor: Lawrence Franz, 
JPEO Armaments and Ammunition 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Joint Applied Project Report
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
AMMUNITION INDUSTRIAL BASE ASSESSMENT TOOL IN SUPPORT OF 
“PUBLIC LAW 105-261, SECTION 806: PROCUREMENT OF 
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION”
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Brian Meierdiercks
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)











11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
 This project investigated the feasibility of establishing a standardized approach for evaluating 
procurements of conventional ammunition for potential limitation to the National Industrial and Technology 
Base (NTIB) that meets the intent of Public law 105-261, Section 806: Procurement of Conventional 
Ammunition and proposes a methodology to do so. The purpose is to decrease workload while increasing 
consistency in this process. The end result is an analysis tool and instructions to be used by personnel from 
the Joint Program Executive Office Armaments and Ammunition, the Joint Munitions Command and the 
Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center when performing industrial base analyses in 
support of the Procurement of Conventional Ammunition statute. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS
ammunition, national technology and industrial base, NTIB, conventional ammunition, 





















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
AMMUNITION INDUSTRIAL BASE ASSESSMENT TOOL IN SUPPORT OF 
“PUBLIC LAW 105-261, SECTION 806: PROCUREMENT OF CONVENTIONAL 
AMMUNITION” 
Brian Meierdiercks, Civilian, Department of the Army 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 2019 




Raymond D. Jones 
Academic Associate, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
AMMUNITION INDUSTRIAL BASE ASSESSMENT TOOL IN 
SUPPORT OF “PUBLIC LAW 105-261, SECTION 806: 
PROCUREMENT OF CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION” 
ABSTRACT 
This project investigated the feasibility of establishing a standardized approach 
for evaluating procurements of conventional ammunition for potential limitation to 
the National Industrial and Technology Base (NTIB) that meets the intent of Public 
law 105-261, Section 806: Procurement of Conventional Ammunition and 
proposes a methodology to do so. The purpose is to decrease workload while 
increasing consistency in this process. The end result is an analysis tool and instructions 
to be used by personnel from the Joint Program Executive Office Armaments and 
Ammunition, the Joint Munitions Command and the Armament Research, 
Development and Engineering Center when performing industrial base analyses in 
support of the Procurement of Conventional Ammunition statute. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. PURPOSE ...................................................................................................1 
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT PROCESS .................................1 
C. BENEFITS OF A STANDARDIZED APPROACH ...............................1 
D. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................2 
E. ORGANIZATION .....................................................................................2 
II. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................3 
A. PUBLIC LAW 105–261, SECTION 806: PROCUREMENT OF 
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION .......................................................3 
B. CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION .......................................................3 
C. DOD’S SINGLE MANAGER FOR CONVENTIONAL 
AMMUNITION..........................................................................................4 
D. DEFINITION OF THE NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND 
INDUSTRIAL BASE .................................................................................4 
E. MAKEUP OF THE CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION 
INDUSTRIAL BASE .................................................................................5 
F. CONTRACTION OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASE .................................6 
G. ESTABLISHMENT OF PEO AMMUNITION IN 2002 ........................7 
H. DELEGATION OF SECTION 806 AUTHORITY ................................8 
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE SECTION 806 PROCESS TODAY .............9 
J. PREVIOUS STUDIES .............................................................................10 
1. Battelle Report .............................................................................10 
2. Joint Ordnance Commanders Group Industrial Base 
Assessment Tools Assessment Action (JOCGIBATAA) ..........11 
III. DATA ....................................................................................................................13 
A. SECTION 806 ANALYSES PER YEAR ...............................................13 
B. RISK RATINGS.......................................................................................15 
C. AVAILABLE DATA SOURCES ...........................................................16 
1. SMCA Industrial Base Assessment Tool (IBAT) ......................16 
2. Army Supplier Risk Tracker (ASRT) ........................................17 
3. Section 806 Database ...................................................................17 
4. SMCA Section 806 Watch List ...................................................17 
IV. ANALYSIS ...........................................................................................................19 
A. OUTPUTS DESIRED ..............................................................................19 
viii 
B. INPUTS NEEDED ...................................................................................20 
C. SELECTION OF DATA SOURCES FOR INPUTS ............................20 
D. LINKING DATA ACROSS SOURCES ................................................22 
E. ANSWERING KEY QUESTIONS ........................................................23 
F. GENERATING OUTPUT.......................................................................25 
1. Risk Statement .............................................................................25 
2. Likelihood .....................................................................................26 
3. Consequence .................................................................................26 
4. Risk Matrix ...................................................................................28 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................29 
APPENDIX A.  SECTION 806 ASSESSMENT TOOL AS IMPLEMENTED 
IN MICROSOFT EXCEL. ..................................................................................31 
A. INPUT TAB ..............................................................................................31 
B. CALCULATION TAB ............................................................................34 
C. DEMAND PIVOT ....................................................................................38 
D. STATIC DATA ........................................................................................39 
APPENDIX B.  USER GUIDE .......................................................................................41 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................43 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Map of the Ammunition Industrial Base. Source: United States 
Army (2019).................................................................................................5 
Figure 2. Aggregated U.S. Census Bureau Statistics of U.S. Businesses for 
Ammunition Manufacturing (North American Industry 
Classification System Codes 332992 [Small Arms] and 332993 
[Other than Small Arms]). Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2019). ................7 
Figure 3. Current SMCA Organization .......................................................................9 
Figure 4. Graph of Section 806 Analyses by Year. Source: Project Director 
Joint Services (2019)..................................................................................13 
Figure 5. Graph of the Number of Personnel Performing Section 806 
Assessments by Year. Source: Project Director Joint Services 
(2019). ........................................................................................................14 
Figure 6. Graph of the number of Section 806 Assessments each Assessor has 
Performed. Source: Project Director Joint Services (2019). ......................15 
Figure 7. Graph of the Distribution of Overall Risk Ratings Assigned by 
Section 806 Assessments. Source: Project Director Joint Services 
(2019). ........................................................................................................16 
Figure 8. Crosslinking Data Sources .........................................................................23 
Figure 9. Flow Chart of Information Flow from Data Sources .................................25 
Figure 10. Notional Significance Relationship ...........................................................27 
Figure 11. Standard Risk Matrix. Source: Office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineeering (2017). ...........................28 
Figure 12. Screenshot of Input Tab Worksheet ...........................................................31 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. List of Ammunition Production GOGOs and GOCOs. Source: 
United States Army (2019). .........................................................................6 
Table 2. Aggregated JOCGIBATAA Ratings. Source: Project Director Joint 
Services (2014). .........................................................................................12 
Table 3. Crosswalk of Inputs Needed and Sources Available .................................22 
Table 4. Likelihood Scoring.....................................................................................26 
Table 5. Consequence Values As a Function of the Significance and SER 
Rating .........................................................................................................28 
Table 6. Formulas Used in Input Tab Worksheet ....................................................32 
Table 7. Formulas Used in Calculation Tab Worksheet ..........................................35 
Table 8. Formulas Used in Demand Pivot Worksheet .............................................38 
Table 9. Data Fields in Static Data Worksheets .......................................................39 
 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AHP Analytic Hierarchy Process 
AMC Army Materiel Command 
ARDEC Armament Research Development and Engineering Center 
ASA(ALT) Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology) 
ASRT Army Supplier Risk Tracker 
CAGE Commercial and Government Entity 
COCO contractor-owned, contractor-operated 
DB database 
DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency 
DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoDD Department of Defense Directive\ 
DoDI Department of Defense Instruction 
DSI Decision Sciences, Incorporated 
FY fiscal year 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GOCO government-owned, contractor-operated 
GOGO government-owned, government-operated 
IBA industrial base analysis 
IBAT Industrial Base Assessment Tool 
ICAP Industrial Committee of Ammunition Producers 
JMC Joint Munitions Command 
JOCG Joint Ordnance Commanders Group 
JOCGIBATAA Joint Ordnance Commanders Group Industrial Base Assessment 
Tools Assessment Action 
JPEO A&A Joint Program Executive Office Armaments and Ammunition 
LMI Logistics Management Institute 
MIBTF Munitions Industrial Base Task Force 
MIPA Munitions Industrial Production Assessment 
xiv 
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 
NDIA National Defense Industrial Association 
NIIN National Item Identification Number 
NTIB National Technology and Industrial Base 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
PEO Program Executive Office 
PD JS Project Director Joint Services 
PM project manager 
PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratories 
POCs Points of Contact 
SER Supplier Evaluation Risk 
SMCA Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition 
SOS Source of Supply 
U.S. United States 








The Joint Program Executive Office, Armaments and Ammunition (JPEO A&A) 
conducts dozens of industrial base assessments on behalf of the Department of Defense 
(DoD) annually. These industrial base assessments are performed for every procurement 
of conventional ammunition as part of the process supporting implementation of Public 
Law 105-261, Section 806, which within the ammunition community is normally referred 
to simply as “Section 806.” However, the process for conducting these assessments is not 
standardized, resulting in inconsistent methodologies, conclusions and quality. This project 
seeks to establish a standardized analysis approach for use on all Section 806 industrial 
base assessments. 
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT PROCESS 
Section 806 industrial base assessments are performed by individuals across several 
organizations, including JPEO A&A, the Joint Munitions Command (JMC), Armament 
Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) and support contractors. 
Individuals across these organizations have their own approaches and priorities, as well as 
their preferred data sources. These inconsistencies result in a need for reconciliation and 
rework before being staffed to JPEO A&A for final approval. In recent years, there has 
been a further concern as fewer individuals are devoted to performing the assessments. 
While this helps reduce variability, it decreases the available institutional knowledge in the 
event key personnel are lost. Finally, the assessments’ conclusions are at times 
controversial and risk impacting program schedules, either to address the assessment’s 
concerns or to simply resolve conflicting opinions over the existence of a concern. 
C. BENEFITS OF A STANDARDIZED APPROACH 
A standardized approach could resolve these issues by more consistently linking 
acquisition details and industrial base concerns to the overall program risk assessment. 
Doing so will enable leadership to make informed decisions regarding the Section 806 
2 
process since concerns can be traced back to an element within the process rather than the 
opinions of the individual performing the assessment. A standardized approach should also 
reduce the man-hours required to perform these assessments. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this project was to research past guidance, previous 
studies and available data sources to generate a consistent approach to performing these 
Section 806 analyses. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I introduces the purpose of this project. Chapter II provides background on 
the circumstances that led to the need for the Section 806 statute as well as how this 
responsibility ended up with JPEO A&A. Chapter III presents data to better illustrate the 
scale of the problem as well as possible contributors to a solution. Chapter IV illustrates an 
analysis of how to achieve a solution. Chapter V provides conclusions and 
recommendations for implementing that solution. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. PUBLIC LAW 105–261, SECTION 806: PROCUREMENT OF 
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION 
In October of 1998, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Strom Thurmond 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No 105–261 § 806, 
(Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act [STNDAA], 1998). Section 806 of 
this law requires the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Single Manager for Conventional 
Ammunition (SMCA) to limit specific procurements of conventional ammunition to 
sources within the National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) when necessary to 
maintain suppliers needed in case of national emergency or to achieve industrial 
mobilization (STNDAA, 1998). This requirement was fully implemented 11 September 
2001 with a DoD a rule amending the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS) requiring all agency heads to submit their acquisition plans to the SMCA for 
review and instructs them to await written concurrence before proceeding with their 
procurement (Government of the United States, DoD, 2001). The Army provided further 
guidance in 2014 through Army Regulation (AR) 700–90.  
For each procurement of Class 5 ammunition, an analysis will be performed 
in accordance with Public Law 105-261. The analysis will identify and 
make acquisition strategy recommendations for the end item and all 
components to be acquired that appear on the “Section 806 Watch List” also 
known as the “Conventional Ammunition End Item and/or component at 
risk list.” The analysis will also consider the magnitude of the procurement 
compared to the current capacity utilization, and financial viability of the 
ammunition production facilities available to produce the items, and the 
potential impact of the overall acquisition strategy. (United States Army, 
2014) 
B. CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION 
The Strom Thurmond NDAA for FY99 references the 1995 issuance of DoD 
Directive 5160.65 for the definition of conventional ammunition (STNDAA, 1998). That 
directive defines conventional ammunition as a “device charged with explosives, 
propellants, pyrotechnics, or initiating composition for use in connection with defense or 
offense, including demolitions. Certain ammunition can be used for training, ceremonial, 
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or nonoperational purposes” (Department of Defense [DoD], 1995). Because this definition 
is broad, it includes items that may not be thought of as conventional ammunition, such as 
smart bombs, guided missiles and explosive armor tiles. 
C. DOD’S SINGLE MANAGER FOR CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION 
Prior to creation of the SMCA, ammunition management responsibilities were 
distributed across DoD (GAO, 1973). Reports by the Logistics Management Institute 
(Logistics Management Institute, 1970) and the General Accounting Office (GAO, 1973) 
identified issues with this approach to ammunition management during the Vietnam War 
and recommended consolidation of these responsibilities under a single DoD entity. In 
1975, DoD assigned the role of SMCA to the Secretary of the Army (GAO, U. S. 
Government Accountability Office, 1999). The Secretary of the Army retains this role 
today. While some functions have been successfully consolidated under the SMCA, full 
realization of a single DoD entity being responsible for all aspects of conventional 
ammunition management was not achieved (GAO, U. S. Government Accountability 
Office, 1999), resulting in the need for the Section 806 law. If the SMCA managed the 
acquisition of all conventional ammunition, the SMCA would already be able to limit 
procurements to the NTIB under existing authority (Contracts: Competition Requirements 
10 U.S.C. § 2304(c), 2011). 
D. DEFINITION OF THE NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL 
BASE 
The 1993 NDAA defined the National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) as 
“the persons and organizations that are engaged in research, development, production, or 
maintenance activities conducted within the United States and Canada” (National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No 102–484, § 4203, 1992). The 2017 
NDAA modified this definition to include the United Kingdom and Australia as part of the 
NTIB (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No 114–328, § 
881, 2016). 
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E. MAKEUP OF THE CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION INDUSTRIAL 
BASE 
The conventional ammunition industrial base includes hundreds of facilities that 
are a mix of government-owned, government-operated (GOGO), government-owned 
contractor-operated (GOCO) and contractor-owned contractor-operated (COCO) facilities 
located across the globe as illustrated in Figure 1. These facilities produce raw materials, 
components, sub-assemblies and final products. Many of the facilities were built during 
the 1940s to support the United States and its allies during World War II (Eaton, 2006).  
 
Figure 1. Map of the Ammunition Industrial Base. Source: United 
States Army (2019). 
While the list of COCOs within the ammunition industrial base is too extensive to 
list, Table 1 contains a list of GOGOs and GOCOs and summary of their products (United 
States Army, 2019). 
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Table 1. List of Ammunition Production GOGOs and GOCOs. 
Source: United States Army (2019). 
Facility Name Facility Type Products 
Allegany Ballistics Lab GOCO Tank Cartridges, Fuzing 
Crane Army 
Ammunition Activity GOGO Pyrotechnics 
Holston Army 
Ammunition Plant GOCO Explosives 
Iowa Army 
Ammunition Plant GOCO 
Artillery Projectiles, Mortars, Missile Warheads, 
Demolitions, Salute Rounds 
Lake City Army 
Ammunition Plant GOCO Small Caliber Munitions 
McAlester Army 




GOGO Rocket Motors 
Pine Bluff Arsenal GOGO Pyrotechnics 
Radford Army 
Ammunition Plant GOCO Propellants 
Scranton Army 
Ammunition Plant GOCO 
Projectile Metal Parts for Artillery, Mortars and 
Navy Gun 
 
F. CONTRACTION OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASE 
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the domestic 
ammunition industrial base contracted significantly between 1978 and 1999 due in part to 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and associated decline in requirements (GAO, U. S. 
Government Accountability Office, 1999). As shown in the Figure 2, the number of firms 
(businesses), establishments (physical locations) and personnel employed in 




Figure 2. Aggregated U.S. Census Bureau Statistics of U.S. 
Businesses for Ammunition Manufacturing (North American Industry 
Classification System Codes 332992 [Small Arms] and 332993 [Other than 
Small Arms]). Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2019). 
G. ESTABLISHMENT OF PEO AMMUNITION IN 2002 
In 1986, President Ronald Reagan directed the creation of Program Executive 
Officers (PEO) (Reagan, 1986) as recommended by the Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Defense Management (President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Managment, 
1986). A decade later, there was still no PEO for Ammunition within the Army despite the 
Secretary of the Army’s role as the SMCA. In 1997, the Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory released a report for the Army recommending that ammunition be managed as 
a major program with management responsibilities consolidated under a new PEO (Pacific 
Northwest National Laboratories (PNNL), 1997). The Government Accountability Office 
agreed with these findings, but found that by 1999, the Army had not made significant 
progress in implementing this recommendation (GAO, U. S. Government Accountability 
Office, 1999). Further need for an ammunition PEO was evidenced in 2001 when the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) (ASA(ALT)) 
required that all Army acquisition programs be managed by an office reporting to a PEO 
or directly to ASA(ALT) (Oscar, 2001). On 14 January 2002, PEO Ammunition was finally 
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chartered with responsibility for the life cycle acquisition management of all Army 
conventional ammunition (Bolton, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics 
and Technology), 2002). In 2018, PEO Ammunition underwent a name change and is now 
the Joint Program Executive Office, Armaments and Ammunition (Calloway, 2018). 
H. DELEGATION OF SECTION 806 AUTHORITY 
At the time of PEO Ammunition’s creation, the Secretary of the Army had 
delegated the SMCA authority, including its Section 806 authority, to the ASA(ALT) 
(Caldera, 2000). In 2002, ASA(ALT) delegated partial Section 806 authority to PEO 
Ammunition (Bolton, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology), 2002). PEO Ammunition was allowed to sign Section 806 determinations, 
but ASA(ALT) retained the Section 806 authority to unilaterally change the acquisition 
approach of another DoD component. In 2003 PEO Ammunition was designated the 
SMCA executor and again delegated partial Section 806 authority (Bolton, Assistant 
Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), 2003). This arrangement 
has continued to this day (Shyu, 2014). The Project Director Joint Services (PD JS) is the 
office within JPEO A&A charged with managing the Section 806 process. Figure 3 
illustrates the delegation of authorities from USD(A&S) to PD JS. 
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Figure 3. Current SMCA Organization 
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE SECTION 806 PROCESS TODAY 
The Section 806 process is as follows (Meehan, Public Law 105-261 Section 806 
Process Overview, 2015): 
1. DoD component completes Section 806 request memo based on standard 
template from PD JS. 
2. The PD JS Section 806 coordinator reviews the request memo and assigns 
an assessor (usually an engineer from PEO Ammunition, JMC or 
ARDEC) based on expertise and availability. 
3. The assessor reviews the request memo and identifies any Section 806 
Watch List items within the procurement.  
4. The assessor then attempts to identify the risk to the NTIB (normally 
based on a comparison of the quantity being purchased to the capacity of 
known suppliers). Other factors such as the number of suppliers or known 
supplier issues are sometimes used as well. These other factors come 
through a variety of channels such as project managers, industry 
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representatives (e.g., Munitions Industrial Base Task Force [MIBTF] or 
the National Defense Industrial Association’s [NDIA] Industrial 
Committee of Ammunition Producers [ICAP]) as well as from individual 
companies. 
5. The assessor documents this assessment in a report known as an Industrial 
Base Analysis (IBA) and assigns an overall level of risk which is normally 
the same as the highest risk determined in the previous step. 
6. The assessor drafts a Section 806 Determination memo for JPEO A&A to 
sign. 
7. The IBA and Section 806 Determination memo are staffed through PD JS 
and JPEO A&A headquarters to be signed by JPEO A&A. 
J. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
1. Battelle Report 
In 2004, the Battelle Memorial Institute produced a report for PEO Ammo with 
recommendations for standardizing and automating the Section 806 process (Laughlin & 
Porcella, 2004). The authors advocated for a quantifiable, defendable, repeatable process 
by applying business metrics. These metrics were as follows: 
• Impact of Critical Items List 
• % Capacity Utilization of Supply Base 
• Corporate Financial Risk of NTIB Supplier 
• Business Volume-Minimum Sustaining Rate 
Automation was to be achieved using a web-based solution powered by software 
called TeamTrack by Serena along with Expert Choice Software and Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) decision methodology. While this approach appeared promising, it was not 
implemented. The reason for this is not known to this author, but clearly would have 
11 
required a resourcing decision to fund the development, software licenses and maintenance 
of the system. 
2. Joint Ordnance Commanders Group Industrial Base Assessment 
Tools Assessment Action (JOCGIBATAA) 
A 2012 meeting of the Joint Ordnance Commanders Group resulted in an action 
assigned to the Project Director Joint Services to assess available industrial base 
assessment tools within OSD, DCMA, ARDEC, JMC, JPEO A&A and AMC to identify 
opportunities for leveraging capabilities and improving overall industrial base assessments 
(Meehan, JOCG Action 2012–07 Industrial Base Assessment (IBA) Tools, 2014).  
Organizations were solicited for available industrial base assessment tools. 
The tools were assessed for maturity and conventional ammunition content. 
Thirteen (13) tools were selected for further analysis. Information Needs for 
Industrial Base Assessments were gathered based upon Guide to DoDI 
5000.60 NOV 2013 and SMCA Industrial Base Assessment processes. 
Twenty (20) informational needs were identified. A forty-one (41) question 
survey was constructed to evaluate how well the 13 tools covered the 20 
information needs for industrial base assessments. The survey was 
distributed to primary organizational Points of Contact (POCs). The results 
were analyzed and an initial “suite” of industrial base assessment tools was 
determined. This suite was constructed of the tools which received a 
maximum rating for at least one of the information needs identified in the 
survey. (Meehan, JOCG Action 2012–07 Industrial Base Assessment (IBA) 
Tools, 2014).  
This effort allowed the ammunition community to gain a joint insight into existing 
tools at hand. The resulting ratings allow for selection of the most applicable tools for a 
given application. Of particular interest for an automated tool is the frequency with which 
the data is refreshed. For instance, both the AMC ASRT and DCMA Financial Viability 
information sources had the same rating for the “Source provides info regarding a firm’s 
financial outlook” criteria, but ASRT’s data is refreshed automatically twice per years 
while DCMA’s requires a specific update effort (Project Director Joint Services, 2014). 
Results of the JOCGIBATAA assessment are summarized in Table 2 for tools that scored 
the highest in at least one of the criteria.  
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Table 2. Aggregated JOCGIBATAA Ratings. Source: 
Project Director Joint Services (2014). 
 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Taxonomy DB  25 18 42 36 45 45 27 45 27 27 27 8 18 27 18 0 54 0 0 0 50 
DCMA 
Financial 
Viability  13 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 0 27 27 45 0 
DCMA MIPA  45 38 61 52 63 63 51 77 51 27 27 54 42 45 64 37 37 54 40 45 56 
ARDEC SOS  37 0 75 37 67 37 0 67 45 45 37 37 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 100 
SMCA IBAT  76 38 67 59 71 57 47 62 62 62 44 69 42 56 50 41 48 33 51 51 61 




A. SECTION 806 ANALYSES PER YEAR 
Figure 4 provides a sense of how many Section 806 analyses are actually performed 
in a given year from FY04 to FY17. Over this timeframe, 1,231 Section 806 analyses were 
performed by JPEO A&A which equates to an average of 86 analyses per year. More 
recently, the average has been lower at ~70 analyses per year. 
 
 
Figure 4. Graph of Section 806 Analyses by Year. 
Source: Project Director Joint Services (2019). 
The number of individual assessors that this workload has been distributed across 
has fluctuated greatly over this same timeframe as shown in Figure 5. The number of 
assessors has tended to be a function of management/policy changes and efficiency efforts 
rather than the number of analyses needed. 
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Figure 5. Graph of the Number of Personnel Performing Section 806 
Assessments by Year. Source: Project Director Joint Services (2019). 
In total, 48 different people performed analyses during this time. Figure 6 shows 
how these analyses have been distributed across these assessors. During this timeframe, 
there have been four Section 806 leads who are responsible for the program as a whole and 
perform the bulk of the analyses. The rest are performed by other subject matter experts or 




Figure 6. Graph of the number of Section 806 Assessments each 
Assessor has Performed. Source: Project Director Joint Services (2019). 
B. RISK RATINGS 
Every Section 806 analysis includes an overall risk rating of Low, Low to 
Moderate, Moderate, Moderate to High or High. This risk rating is determined qualitatively 
by the assessor based on their judgment and is specifically meant to identify the risk placed 
on the NTIB by a given procurement. However, the risk ratings are not defined and are 
ultimately based on the individual assessor’s experience. As shown in Figure 7, the risk 
ends up being “Low” nearly every time. While this may simply mean that DoD is routinely 
making low risk procurements of conventional ammunition, greater stratification of the 













Section 806 Analyses per Assessor
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Figure 7. Graph of the Distribution of Overall Risk Ratings Assigned 
by Section 806 Assessments. Source: Project Director Joint Services (2019). 
C. AVAILABLE DATA SOURCES 
1. SMCA Industrial Base Assessment Tool (IBAT) 
The Industrial Base Assessment Tool (IBAT) is a web-based decision support tool 
that provides supply chain management and decision support information of critical 
ammunition components and end items across functional organizations to enhance 
acquisition planning and industrial base preparedness. The IBAT warehouses information 
on over 1200 end items, over 290 suppliers and 1300 components (IBAT Executive 
Summary, 2018). 
IBAT is useful for identifying the major components of an item, FYDP demand for 
those components, where those components are produced, the capacities of those producers 









Risk Ratings for FY04-17
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Development of this tool was funded by JPEO Armaments & Ammunition and the 
Joint Munitions Command beginning in FY2002. Decision Sciences Inc. (DSI) designed 
and developed the application (Decision Sciences Inc., n.d.). 
2. Army Supplier Risk Tracker (ASRT) 
The ASRT provides information about the financial health of Army suppliers and 
potential risk in doing business with them. Utilizing information from Dun and Bradstreet 
financial services, ASRT provides a current risk assessment and risk trends for each 
supplier. Suppliers in ASRT are associated with the weapon systems they support 
providing the opportunity to link supplier financial health to risk of availability of materiel 
items (Army Supplier Risk Tracker, 2018). 
ASRT is useful for understanding the current financial stability of company 
and distills this down to a single numerical value called the Supplier Evaluation Risk 
Score which indicates the likelihood of a company going into bankruptcy on a scale of 
one to nine. 
3. Section 806 Database 
Beginning in October of 2003, PD JS has tracked each request for Section 806 
Determination in a database which has evolved from a Microsoft Excel worksheet into a 
Microsoft Access database that is stored on a JPEO A&A server. This database contains 
key metrics like signature dates, status of the request, item names and identifiers, Watch 
List items, overall risk determined, requestor contact information and NTIB limitations. 
This database is useful for establishing historical trends such as those shown in 
Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
4. SMCA Section 806 Watch List 
The SMCA Section 806 Watch List identifies ammunition end items, components, 
and/or capabilities that are essential for supplying military ammunition in cases of national 
emergency or to achieve industrial mobilization and potentially qualify for limited 
competition within the National Technology and Industrial Base (Program Executive 
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Office Ammunition, 2015). This list is used by the Section 806 assessors to focus their 
analyses since a given ammunition item can have over 100 components. The current Watch 
List contains 28 categories. The list’s distribution is limited to DoD and U.S. DoD 
contractors (Distribution statement D) and so is not shown here. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. OUTPUTS DESIRED 
Pub. Law 105–261 Section 806, (b) states that the requirement is for the SMCA to 
limit procurements of ammunition to the NTIB if it is determined that “such limitation is 
necessary to maintain a facility, producer, manufacturer, or other supplier available for 
furnishing an essential item of ammunition or ammunition component in cases of national 
emergency or to achieve industrial mobilization” (Strom Thurmond National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No 105–261 § 806, 1998). 
The Section 806 analysis should establish that limitation is necessary to maintain a 
supplier. In other words, if the facility is expected to be sustained regardless of whether 
they receive this work, there is no need for the SMCA to use its Section 806 authority to 
alter the procurement. Since this has to do with impacts in the future, this is a question of 
risk rather than a binary yes/no assessment. The analysis should provide the SMCA 
Executor with an indication of the risk associated with approving the proposed acquisition 
strategy on the NTIB. 
To arrive at this conclusion, it is necessary to answer the following key questions: 
KEY QUESTIONS 
 
 Does this procurement include any SMCA Section 806 Watch List items? 
1. Which NTIB producers are potential sources of these Watch List items? 
2. How many NTIB producers are there? 
3. Are these NTIB producers financially viable at this time? 
4. Is the quantity being procured significant to these producers? 
5. Does this quantity represent a significant proportion of the expected 
demand these producers can compete for? 
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6. Is the procuring PM sourcing this item and/or its components from the 
NTIB? 
B. INPUTS NEEDED 
Answering the key questions will require some basic inputs to be gathered from the 
procuring PM or available data sources. A listing of these inputs is presented here. 
 Item being procured 
1. Quantity being procured 
2. Proposed acquisition approach 
3. Acquisition timeframe 
4. Number of NTIB producers 
5. Financial viability 
6. SMCA Section 806 Watch List 
7. Producer capacities 
8. DoD demand 
9. Bills of Materials 
C. SELECTION OF DATA SOURCES FOR INPUTS 
The JOCGIBATAA effort did a thorough job of rating various data sources. The 
SMCA IBAT had the highest score in 12 of the 20 informational needs measured. No other 
tool came close. This makes sense since SMCA IBAT was developed specifically to 
support SMCA analysis needs (including Section 806 analyses) so will be used as a primary 
data source here. Specifically, IBAT links items to their producers (Input #5), capacities 
(Input #8), POM demand (Input #9) and bills of materials (Input #10). 
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JOCGIBATAA assessed tools’ content regarding firm’s financial outlook (Input 
#6). The DCMA Financial Viability and AMC ASRT tied for the highest score. However, 
AMC ASRT got the highest possible score for update frequency (100) while DCMA 
Financial Viability received the lowest (0). This is due to the fact that ASRT is updated 
twice per year while DCMA Financial Viability is an as-requested service. One criteria not 
used in the JOCGIBATAA effort, but applied here, is the ease of linking the data sources 
together as this will be important for automating data acquisition and calculation. In this 
case, both SMCA IBAT and ASRT identify producers by CAGE code. Since ASRT was 
rated highest for Financial Viability, is updated regularly and is compatible, with SMCA 
IBAT, it will be used for Financial Viability (Input #6). 
JOCGIBATAA did not assess this whether information sources identified SMCA 
Section 806 Watch List items (Input #7). However, the SMCA Section 806 Watch List is 
readily listed as items and their National Item Identification Number (NIIN). NIINs are the 
primary unique identifier for items within SMCA IBAT. This effort will produce this list 
as its own input. SMCA IBAT has a field for this, but it is not currently used. While easily 
remedied, it is recommended that future updates to the Watch List include lists of items by 
NIIN and that SMCA IBAT use the Watch List indicator field. 
Inputs 1, 2, 3 and 4 (Item being procured, Quantity being procured, Proposed 
acquisition approach and Acquisition timeframe) are details specific to the procurement 
and must be supplied by the requesting PM office. PD JS uses a standard Section 806 
Request form to collect this information already. Included in the request form is a field for 
the item’s NIIN which allows for use with both the Watch List and SMCA IBAT. Table 3 
illustrates that all of the required inputs can be gathered using the four data sources 






Table 3. Crosswalk of Inputs Needed and Sources Available 
  Sources 
  Section 806 
Request 
SMCA IBAT ASRT SMCA Section 





1. Item being 
procured 
X - - - 
2. Quantity being 
procured 
X - - - 
3. Proposed 
acquisition approach 
X - - - 
4. Acquisition 
timeframe 
X - - - 
5. No. of NTIB 
Producers 
- X - - 
6. Financial Viability - - X - 
7. Watch List - - - X 
8. Capacities - X - - 
9. Demand - X - - 
10. Bills of Materials - X - - 
 
D. LINKING DATA ACROSS SOURCES 
The SMCA Section 806 Watch List and Section 806 Request contain item 
information arranged by NIIN, but no producer information. The ASRT contains producer 
information arranged by Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) code, but no item 
information. The SMCA IBAT contains both item information arranged by NIIN and 
producer information arranged by CAGE code. As such, the SMCA IBAT can be used to 
link the three data sources together with NIINs as the item unique identifier and CAGE 
code as the Producer unique identifier. Figure 8 illustrates the manner in which information 
can be linked across data sources using NIINs and CAGE codes. 
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Figure 8. Crosslinking Data Sources 
E. ANSWERING KEY QUESTIONS 
Using the inputs from the sources listed Table 3, all of the key questions can be 
answered in a consistent fashion. 
1. The procuring PM provides end item NIIN, quantity, timeframe and 
acquisition approach. 
2. The bill of materials is pulled from SMCA IBAT as a list of component 
NIINs and production factors. 
3. Component NIINs are checked against the Watch List to filter out non-
Watch List items which will not need further analysis. 
     -Answers “Does this procurement include any SMCA Section 806 
Watch List items?” 
4. The acquisition approach is then used to mark components that the 
procuring PM is already requiring to be procured from the NTIB. These 
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components will not need further analysis. 
     -Answers “Is the procuring PM sourcing this item and/or its 
components from the NTIB?” 
5. NTIB producers of the components are then pulled from SMCA IBAT 
along with their associated CAGE codes and monthly maximum 
capacities. 
     -Answers “Which NTIB producers are potential sources of these Watch 
List items?” 
6. Producers of each component are counted. 
     -Answers “How many NTIB producers are there?” 
7. Supplier Evaluation Risk ratings are pulled from ASRT using producer 
CAGE codes to identify the financial viability of each producer. 
     -Answers “Are these NTIB producers financially viable at this time?” 
8. End item quantity is multiplied by the component production factors to 
determine component quantities in the procurement. 
9. DoD demand is pulled from SMCA IBAT using component NIINs and the 
acquisition timeframe. 
10. Component quantities are divided by DoD demand for those components. 
     -Answers “Does this quantity represent a significant proportion of the 
expected demand these producers can compete for?” 
11. Producer capacities are summed to determine the overall NTIB capacity to 
produce each component. 
12. Component quantities are then divided by the NTIB capacity. 
     -Answers “Is the quantity being procured significant to these 
producers?” 
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Figure 9 illustrates the flow of the inputs from the data sources to derive interim 
information and ultimately answer the key questions. 
 
Figure 9. Flow Chart of Information Flow from Data Sources 
F. GENERATING OUTPUT 
With key questions answered, the next step is to frame the procurement in terms of 
risk which is the desired output of this process. 
1. Risk Statement 
The DoD Risk, Issue, and Opportunity Management Guide for Defense Acquisition 
Programs states that “A good risk statement contains two elements: the potential event and 
the associated consequences” (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
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Systems Engineeering, 2017). The “potential event” is the procurement of an item from 
outside the NTIB. The “associated consequence” is loss of work to NTIB producers. 
Converting this to a risk statement, it can be phrased as “Item is not procured from an NTIB 
producer resulting in lost work to the NTIB.” 
2. Likelihood 
The likelihood of an end item or component being procured outside of the NTIB is 
most directly affected by the procuring PM’s acquisition approach. The procuring PM can 
make sourcing from within the NTIB nearly a guarantee (e.g., limiting competition to 
NTIB sources). They can also make sourcing from outside of the NTIB nearly a guarantee 
(e.g., by awarding sole source to company outside of the NTIB). In the event that the 
procuring PM allows for full and open worldwide competition, determining the likelihood 
is more difficult. One indicator available is the number of NTIB producers. Assuming each 
producer has a greater than zero chance of winning work awarded through competition, 
likelihood that none of them wins the work decreases as the number of NTIB producers 
increases. For near-term implementation, the author suggests the following likelihood 
scoring methodology. Refinements can then be made by keeping a record of how 
frequently NTIB sources are able to win work awarded competitively.  
Table 4. Likelihood Scoring 
Acquisition Approach No. of NTIB 
Suppliers 
Likelihood 
Requires NTIB Source Any 1 
Allows for NTIB and Non-NTIB Sources >2 2 
Allows for NTIB and Non-NTIB Sources 2 3 
Allows for NTIB and Non-NTIB Sources 1 4 
Allows for NTIB and Non-NTIB Sources 0 5 




The consequence of an item being procured outside of the NTIB is dependent on 
how financially viable NTIB producers are and how significant the procurement is. 
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Financial viability is readily available as the Supplier Evaluation Risk (SER) rating 
from ASRT. In the event there is more than one NTIB producer, the highest rating will be 
used. This rating will be converted from its 1 to 9 scale into a percentage allow for 
commonality with the significance component of the rating. This is done by simply 
dividing by the maximum value (i.e., 9). 
Significance of the procurement has two components (Percentage of DoD demand 
and percentage of NTIB capacity) as notionally shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Notional Significance Relationship 
For initial implementation, it will be assumed that significance can be taken as the 
average of the two percentages. Once enough real data is collected, this can be refined 
further. The same approach will be taken to combine the resulting Significance value with 






Table 5. Consequence Values As a Function of the 
Significance and SER Rating 
4. Risk Matrix
With likelihood and consequence now represented on scales of 1 to 5, the risk for 
each Watch List component in the procurement can be represented on a standard risk 
matrix. Overall risk can be reported as the number of high risks and medium risks with all 
of the individual risks shown on the risk matrix to give JPEO A&A a quick indication of 
the type of risks associated with the procuring PM’s acquisition approach. 
Figure 11. Standard Risk Matrix. Source: Office of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineeering (2017). 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on analysis of the purpose of the Section 806 statute and available data 
sources and formats, this project has shown that it is possible to create a standardized, 
automated tool for conducting Section 806 analyses. Benefits are expected to come in the 
form of reduced processing time, reduced subjectivity, increased consistency and greater 
resiliency in the event of staff turnover. 
It is recommended that this tool be implemented in a phased approach. During the 
first phase, the tool would be used in parallel with the existing Section 806 process. Parallel 
processing allows for detection of underlying flaws in the tool’s logic allowing for 
correction without impacting the normal Section 806 approval process. This approach also 
allows for Section 806 assessors and their leadership to become incrementally familiar with 
what the tool offers and what future Section 806 analyses are expected to contain (e.g., risk 
matrix in every assessment). The immediate benefit would be that the tool allows assessors 
a quick check on their own analyses to make sure they have identified all of the Watch List 
items, producers, capacities, etc. Four to six months of this parallel processing should be 
sufficient since that would cover 20 to 30 assessments ensuring a wide breadth of 
procurement scenarios. If supported by stakeholders, implementation would enter the 
second phase. Successful implementation will require support from Section 806 assessors, 
JPEO A&A leadership and procuring PMs. 
The second phase would end the parallel processing and rely on the tool as the 
primary approach to conducting Section 806 analyses. During this phase, the tool may 
continue to evolve as unexpected scenarios are experienced. Each assessment would allow 
for greater refinement of the tool and updates may be frequent. The immediate benefits 
would be reduced workload for the Section 806 assessor and quicker turnaround time for 
the procuring PM. Up to 12 months should be sufficient for this phase as the tool will have 
been used to assess approximately 100 procurements across the first two phases, generating 
an extensive amount of data with which to optimize for. Once again, stakeholder support 
would be needed to enter the next phase. 
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The third and final phase would codify use of the tool with non-critical updates 
made more methodically (e.g., scheduled to coincide with the start of the FY) to limit 
retraining and more strictly ensure version control. This phase fully realizes the expected 
benefits of reduced processing time, reduced subjectivity, increased consistency and 
greater resiliency in the event of staff turnover. 
While a fully working version of this tool has been developed and included in the 
appendix, greater gains could be achieved by embedding the underlying logic into an on-
line platform. Doing so would allow for procuring PMs to enter their acquisition details 
directly rather than filling out the Section 806 Request Form and emailing to PD JS for 
entry into the assessment tool. Eliminating this step would reduce transcription errors and 
allow for immediate feedback to the procuring PM. Feedback could range from simply 
informing the PM of any missing information up to providing the actual risk ratings. 
Reducing barriers to informing the PMs of potential risks in their acquisitions would allow 
the PMs to do so during early acquisition planning in an iterative process without overly 
tasking PD JS personnel. Potential platforms where this tool could be integrated are the 
SMCA IBAT or the Ammunition Enterprise Portal. Both platforms are CAC-enabled 
allowing for controlled access and are already used by the ammunition community. 
The Section 806 Watch List had to be converted into a NIIN-based list for this 
project. It is recommended that creating a NIIN-based Watch List be standard practice. 
Doing so helps both implementation of this project and for indicating Watch List items in 
SMCA IBAT since that system is NIIN-based. 
Finally, since no model can fully cover the endless complexities of reality, this tool 
should continue to be paired with subject matter expertise. This allows the assessment tool 
to handle the repetitive tasks of pulling information and calculation while enabling the 
subject matter expert to focus on unforeseen details and the overall intent of the Section 
806 statute to ensure the NTIB will be able to supply the necessary conventional 
ammunition when called upon. 
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APPENDIX A.  SECTION 806 ASSESSMENT TOOL AS IMPLEMENTED IN MICROSOFT EXCEL. 
A. INPUT TAB 
Figure 12 is a screenshot of the Input Tab worksheet. Real data was used to generate the results, but the NIIN, Nomenclature 
and Watch List Category fields have been replaced with dummy data due to potential sensitivity. 
 
Figure 12. Screenshot of Input Tab Worksheet 
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Table 6 identifies the formulas used in the construction of the Input Tab worksheet. Formulas in row 10 are repeated through 
row 50, but not shown here for brevity. 
Table 6. Formulas Used in Input Tab Worksheet 
Cell Entry 





























H10 =IF(B10=““,”-”,IF(A10=“*Select Value”,”Awaiting Acquisition Approach”,IF(A10=“Requires NTIB Source”,1,IF(A10=“Requires non-NTIB Source”,5,IF(F10=0,5,IF(F10=1,4,IF(F10=2,3,IF(F10>2,2,”?”)))))))) 









































Contains pivot table. Data source is “CalculationTab!$B$9:$AK$80.” Row fields are “Nomenclature” and “Watch List 
Category.” Values fields are “Max of At-risk Suppliers Warning,” “Sum of % of Demand,” “Sum of Number of NTIB 
Producers” and “Sum of Years of NTIB Work as Percentage of Years of the Contract.” Watch List Category filter is used to 
hide “-” values. 
 
B. CALCULATION TAB 
Table 7 identifies the formulas used in the construction of the Calculation Tab worksheet. Formulas in row 10 are repeated 
through row 81, but not shown here for brevity. 
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Table 7. Formulas Used in Calculation Tab Worksheet 
Cell Entry 
E9 =‘Input Tab’!C2 












C10 =IFERROR(VLOOKUP(E10,’Watch List’!$A$1:$C$65525,3,FALSE),”-”) 






=IF(C10=“-”,”-”,IFERROR(IF(OR(I$9<‘Input Tab’!$C$4,I$9>‘Input Tab’!$C$5),0,VLOOKUP($E10,’Demand 
Pivot’!$A$1:$I$65536,3,FALSE)),”-”)) 
J10 
=IF(C10=“-”,”-”,IFERROR(IF(OR(J$9<‘Input Tab’!$C$4,J$9>‘Input Tab’!$C$5),0,VLOOKUP($E10,’Demand 
Pivot’!$A$1:$I$65536,4,FALSE)),”-”)) 
K10 
=IF(C10=“-”,”-”,IFERROR(IF(OR(K$9<‘Input Tab’!$C$4,K$9>‘Input Tab’!$C$5),0,VLOOKUP($E10,’Demand 
Pivot’!$A$1:$I$65536,5,FALSE)),”-”)) 
L10 






=IF(C10=“-”,”-”,IFERROR(IF(OR(M$9<‘Input Tab’!$C$4,M$9>‘Input Tab’!$C$5),0,VLOOKUP($E10,’Demand 
Pivot’!$A$1:$I$65536,7,FALSE)),”-”)) 
N10 
=IF(C10=“-”,”-”,IFERROR(IF(OR(N$9<‘Input Tab’!$C$4,N$9>‘Input Tab’!$C$5),0,VLOOKUP($E10,’Demand 
Pivot’!$A$1:$I$65536,8,FALSE)),”-”)) 
O10 
=IF(C10=“-”,”-”,IFERROR(IF(OR(O$9<‘Input Tab’!$C$4,O$9>‘Input Tab’!$C$5),0,VLOOKUP($E10,’Demand 
Pivot’!$A$1:$I$65536,9,FALSE)),”-”)) 
P10 =IF(OR(P$9<‘Input Tab’!$C$4,P$9>‘Input Tab’!$C$5),0,O10) 
Q10 =IF(OR(Q$9<‘Input Tab’!$C$4,Q$9>‘Input Tab’!$C$5),0,P10) 
R10 =IF(OR(R$9<‘Input Tab’!$C$4,R$9>‘Input Tab’!$C$5),0,Q10) 
































































C. DEMAND PIVOT 
Table 8 provides the details of the pivot table used in the Demand Pivot worksheet. 
Table 8. Formulas Used in Demand Pivot Worksheet 
Cell Entry 
A3 Contains pivot table. Data source is “Demand’!$A$1:$K$65536.” Row fields are “NIIN” and “Nomenclature.” Values fields 
are “Sum of 2017,” “Sum of 2018,” “Sum of 2019,” “Sum of 2020,” “Sum of 20121,” “Sum of 2022” and “Sum of 2023”. 
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D. STATIC DATA 
The remaining worksheets contain static data fields that provide the underlying data 
used in this tool (i.e., these worksheets do not contain formulas or pivot tables). Table 9 
identifies the data fields contained on each static worksheet. Row one of each worksheet 
contains the field name shown in Table 9 while subsequent rows contain the actual data. 
Table 9. Data Fields in Static Data Worksheets 
Worksheet Column Field 
Capacities A NIIN 
Capacities B CAGE 
Capacities C NOMEN 
Capacities D FACILITY_NAME 
Capacities E LINE 
Capacities F STAND_ALONE_1 
Capacities G STAND_ALONE_MAX 
Capacities H Annualized 1-shift Capacity 
Capacities I Annualized Max Capacity 
Capacities J WARM_COLD 
ASRT A Supplier 
ASRT B CAGE 
ASRT C SERS 
BoM A Family 
BoM B End Item NIIN 
BoM C Nomenclature 
BoM D DODIC 
BoM E NIIN 
BoM F Production Factor 
BoM G Unit of Issue 
BoM H Watch List Category 
Demand A Family Name 
Demand B NOMENCLATURE 
Demand C NIIN 
Demand D Service 
Demand E 2017 
Demand F 2018 
Demand G 2019 
Demand H 2020 
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Worksheet Column Field 
Demand I 2021 
Demand J 2022 
Demand K 2023 
Item Info A NIIN 
Item Info B Nomenclature 
Item Info C Family 
Item Info D DODIC 
Item Info E Program Name 
Item Info F Part No. 
Item Info G EndItem/Comp 
Item Info H PM Sub 
Item Info I POM 
Watch List A NIIN 
Watch List B Nomenclature 
Watch List C WL Category 
NTIB Percentage A NIIN 
NTIB Percentage B NOMEN 
NTIB Percentage C Number of NTIB Facilities 
NTIB Percentage D Number of Non-NTIB Facilities 




APPENDIX B.  USER GUIDE 
What follows is an initial user guide for the Microsoft Excel-based Section 806 
Assessment Tool. 
1. Upon receipt of a Section 806 Request form, open a new copy of ‘Section 
806 Assessment Tool.xlsx’ 
2. Save as a unique file name to avoid overwriting previous analyses. 
3. Enter inputs from Section 806 Request form into the Input Tab 
i) Type the 9-digit NIIN of the item being procured from the Section 806 
Request form into Input Tab cell C2 of the assessment tool. Do not include 
any hyphens. 
ii) Type the quantity being procured into Input Tab C4. Ensure the number 
represents units rather than thousands or millions. 
iii) Type the first year of the procurement into Input Tab C5. Use four-digit 
year. 
iv) Type the final year of the procurement into Input Tab C6. Use four-digit 
year. 
4. Update the Input Tab pivot table 
i) Left-click on Input Tab cell B9 (the pivot table) to reveal the ‘PivotTable 
Tools’ in the menu ribbon. 
ii) Left-click on ‘Analyze’ under ‘PivotTable Tools’. 
iii) Left-click ‘Refresh’ in the ‘Data’ group. All Watch List items included in 
this procurement should now be shown in column C starting in row 10. 
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5. For each Watch List item, review the Section 806 Request form to 
determine whether the requestor intends to require an NTIB source, 
require a non-NTIB source or will allow either. 
6. Cell L2 now provides the calculated ‘Overall Risk Level’ for this 
procurement along side the risk matrix illustrating the likelihood and 
consequence risk ratings for each individual Watch List item 
7. Save file and proceed according to Section 806 lead’s quidance (e.g., 
begin staffing to JPEO A&A for approval or engage with requestor to 
address high risk Watch List items). 
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